Youth Work in Prevention of Radicalisation and Extremism’ in Vienna.

ECYC Secretary General Rares and Diana from theFederation of Youth Clubs of Armenia (FYCA) are attending the meeting organised by Radicalisation Awareness Network – RAN on the ‘role of youth work in prevention of radicalisation and extremism’ in Vienna.

After analysing trends and key insights, as well as providing feedback on existing toolboxes and handbooks for youth workers, today we are looking into taboos and how to have difficult discussions with young people.

An ECYC delegation

An ECYC delegation composed of Elena, Joris, Olivier and Rares met with the Cabinet of Commissionner for Education, Culture, Youth and SportTibor Navracsics and the officer of the European Commission working on youth work. Discussions focused on ECYC’s 2016-2018 work plan on ‘youth work’s role in preventing violent radicalisation of young people’ as well as on youth workers’ recommandations on the new #EUYouthStrategy. Today’s meetings were part of the continous cooperation between ECYC and the youth department of the European Commission.

THE 60 DAYS OF PVE CAMPAIGN: LESSONS ON ORGANIZING AN ONLINE, PEER-TO-PEER, COUNTER-RADICALIZATION PROGRAM

Combatting violent extremism can involve organizing Peer-to-Peer (P2P) preventing violent extremism (PVE) programs and social media campaigns. While hundreds of PVE campaigns have been launched around the world in recent months and years, very few of these campaigns have actually been reviewed, analyzed, or assessed in any systematic way. Metrics of success and failure have yet to be fully developed, and very little is publically known as to what might differentiate a great and successful P2P campaign from a mediocre one. This article will provide first-hand insight on orchestrating a publically funded, university-based, online, peer-to-peer PVE campaign – 60 Days of PVE – based on the experience of a group of Canadian graduate students. The article provides an account of the group’s approach to PVE. It highlights the entirety of the group’s campaign, from theory and conceptualization to branding, media strategy, and evaluation, and describes the campaign’s core objectives and implementation. The article also analyzes the campaign’s digital footprint and reach using data gleamed from social media. Finally, the article discusses the challenges and difficulties the group faced in running their campaign, lessons that are pertinent for others contemplating a similar endeavour.

Radicalisation Awareness Network – RAN

Exit work helping people leave an extremist movement, stop their use of violence and change their
opinions has only emerged fairly recently as a field of work. Programmes first came into existence in the
Western world at the end of the last century. The number of radicalised persons as such is rather limited in
size and heterogenous when it comes to kind of extremist ideology, background and motivations that make
them to leave the radical environment in the end. The approach adopted by the various existing exit
programmes differs. Some tend to put more emphasis on behavioural aspects (disengagement), others on
the ideology (deradicalisation). Some programmes are based on therapeutic psychologic insights, others on
youth-work methods. There are no standards in exit work when it comes to assessment, treatment and
registering casesThis range of methodologies and the limited number of cases make it interesting to look at
adjacent fields.
One field that is similar in terms of the process of leaving a group observed is that of cults or sects. Here,
there is a longer tradition of trying to help people get out, as well as a longer history of academic research
on both the cultic environment and leaving mechanisms. When scholar Tore Bjørgo designed one of the
first European exit programmes (in Norway, later implemented in Sweden and Germany), he found his
inspiration in Cultic Studies.
Providing a platform for an exchange of views on what exit work can learn from cults – and vice versa – the
RAN EXIT working group organised a meeting in close cooperation with the International Cultic Studies
Association (ICSA). It took place on 27-28 June in Bordeaux, France.
To a certain extent, it is difficult to distinguish between cults and extremist or radical groups Some cults do
commit violent acts that can be considered as disruptive for society, like the sarin attack on a Tokyo metro
station in 1995 by members of the cult movement Aum Shinrikyo.
Like cults, many extremist or radical groups also have strong internal control mechanisms, create
psychological changes in their members (such as a dependence and a strong degree of identification) and
have a ‘guru’ personality as leader, just like the invisible but always present figure of Al-Baghdadi in Daesh.
So there is no clear-cut line between the two, and there is rather a continuum on which groups can be
placed. For both cults and extremist or radical groups, the groups concerned will sometimes categorise
themselves in that way, but most are more likely to reject the label they are given by the outside world as
either prejudiced or pejorative.
Bringing two fields together also implies bringing together two vocabularies, both of which have their own
rich history of debate when it comes to definitions. To leapfrog this and keep the paper understandable, we
note the differing history of work on ‘cults’ and ‘recovery’ (leaving it) and ‘extremist groups’ and ‘exit’
(leaving it), whilst also noting the overlaps between the two, including with definitions1
.
This paper zooms in on the similarities and differences in terms of leaving cultic and radical groups. Before
concentrating on exit work / recovery, this paper will first look at the group mechanisms that are typical for
both extremist groups and cults, and the variations that can be found here. In the final section, challenges
and opportunities for further cross fertilisation will be explored.